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Abstract
This article aims to determine the stances of media outlets during crises in a polarized media 
system such as Turkey. Adopting a content analysis methodology, this article analyses the framing 
strategies of three national newspapers affiliated with certain sociopolitical camps (namely, the 
pro-government Sabah, the anti-government Kemalist Sözcü and the pro-Gülen Zaman) to observe 
possible similarities/differences during the critical 17 December corruption probe. The findings not 
only confirm earlier studies on ‘press-party’ parallelism but also reveal ‘press-sociopolitical camp 
parallelism’ in Turkey’s polarized media system.
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Introduction
Debates on the roles played by media outlets in shaping public opinion have been ongoing 
since Lippmann and Dewey in the 1920s (Schudson, 2008; Whipple, 2005). While both 
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sides offer compelling arguments, we can safely assume that contemporary news media 
outlets are controversial political actors. According to framing theory (Entman, 1993), pub-
lic perceptions of politics are strongly connected to messages communicated by media out-
lets whose issue characterization can influence public interpretations. Commentary-oriented 
journalism plays a significant role in characterization, such as the polarized perspectives of 
an issue when the media are biased and press–party parallelism is high. Seymour-Ure (1974) 
defines ‘press-party parallelism’ as a degree of partisanship and/or pluralism in mass media 
(p. 157). Hallin and Mancini (2004) broaden its scope with a four-dimensional characteriza-
tion: (the newspaper industry or the development of mass press, ‘political parallelism’, jour-
nalism professionalism, state role in the media system). They identify three types of media 
systems: ‘democratic corporations’, ‘liberal’ and ‘polarized pluralist’.1
Turkey’s media system matches the characteristics of the polarized pluralist model. This 
includes high media integration into party politics (or political parallelism) and state inter-
vention, along with low media commercialization and journalistic professionalism (Akser 
and Baybars-Hawks, 2012; Çarkoğlu et al., 2014; Kaya and Çakmur, 2010; Oğurlu and 
Öncü, 2013). This study investigates Turkey as an under-studied mediascape with polar-
ized characteristics, with particular reference to the political scandal caused by the 17 
December 2013 corruption probe,2 which is predicted to have increased political parallel-
ism dramatically. The main research question motivating this study is whether there were 
systematic and predictable variations in how media outlets framed the corruption probe.
We will show that high party–press parallelism in Turkey extends beyond party politi-
cal lines to follow the contours of the political landscape as shaped by major sociopoliti-
cal camps, which certainly overlap with but also transcend political party lines. We will 
provide partial evidence to support this claim by showing that two media outlets oppos-
ing the governing Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party (AKP)) 
but not organically tied to other political parties followed framing practices commensu-
rate with their political allegiances.
The article will proceed as follows. The first part examines the existing literature in 
framing and the news frames that have been identified (such as corruption, smear cam-
paigns, tampering, sinister powers, fractures within sociopolitical camps and fabricated 
news). The second part describes the 17 December corruption probe, which further dif-
ferentiated the already highly polarized Turkish media system. In particular, the section 
identifies how three national newspapers (the pro-government Sabah, the anti-govern-
ment Sözcü and the pro-Gülen movement Zaman) each strove to protect their affiliated 
sociopolitical camp’s ‘ontological security’,3 as reflected in their conflicting discourses 
concerning the probe. The third part discusses the qualitative content analysis we used to 
measure the frames. Following a discussion of the results of the frames adopted by 
selected media outlets, it concludes that the findings not only confirm earlier studies on 
‘press-party’ parallelism but also reveal ‘press-sociopolitical camp parallelism’ in 
Turkey’s polarized media system.
The media’s dual role in a polarized media system
As Peters (2003) suggests, the media shape the climate of democratic debate and help 
establish and maintain good governance. On the other hand, interpretive journalistic 
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style creates different perspectives, depending on the relationship between context 
and information (Minsky, 1975; Simon and Xenos, 2000). This power to create per-
spectives and differentially emphasize various aspects of an issue does not always act 
as a corrective tool in service of good governance. It can also be used to sway the 
public opinion in favour of a particular position. Journalists tend to portray an issue 
through dichotomies. For example, they provide interpretive cues regarding emerging 
‘political scandals’, sometimes by holding their own parallel trials and by defining 
culprits and victims in line with their political allegiances. Thus, media outlets are not 
merely transmitters of news but are also generators of biased content and partisan 
discourses.
As a typical example of the polarized pluralistic media system typology, this article 
examines Turkey’s case during a highly contentious corruption probe, with an emphasis 
on media outlets’ use of frames. Before investigating this case, however, it is necessary 
to outline framing theory and clarify our proposed frame categories.
Frames in the representation of political corruption
As Patterson (1997) emphasizes, the media power works to a large degree through the 
way in which it frames situations. The particular frames of different news sources create 
a symbolic filter that adopts a particular discourse or focuses on a certain representation 
of events (Kalogeropoulos et al., 2015; Kostadinova and Dimitrova, 2012; Zamora and 
Albaladejo, 2010). Framing, as defined by Entman (1993), is the process by which jour-
nalists ‘select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a com-
municating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (p. 51). Framing is 
thus a critical tool in crises by enabling political powers to influence public opinion in 
order to secure their legitimacy.
The existing literature on corruption employs both generic and issue-specific frames. 
Generic frames can be applied to different topics in different times and cultural contexts 
(De Vreese et al., 2001: 109). To date, the framing researchers have proposed several 
generic frames commonly found in the news (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Iyengar, 
1991). Zamora and Albaladejo (2010), for example, used these to analyse the mediatiza-
tion of corruption cases. Issue-specific frames also play an important role in the framing 
literature. These are drawn from a detailed analysis of the subject matter to define a 
particular approach to the subject (Arroyo, 1997; Canel and Sanders, 2006; Jiménez, 
1995; Protess et al., 1991; Sherman, 1978).
An issue-specific approach to the study of news frames allows the framing of particu-
lar events to be investigated with great specificity and detail. It may capture specific 
aspects of selection, organization and elaboration that are present in news coverage and 
pertain specifically to a well-defined issue (De Vreese et al., 2001: 109). The inductive 
approach involves analysing a news story with an open mind to reveal the array of pos-
sible frames, beginning with very loosely defined preconceptions. This approach can be 
used to detect the many possible ways that an issue can be framed (Semetko and 
Valkenburg, 2000). In this way, Zamora and Albaladejo (2010) identified the following 
five frames specific to corruption issues:
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Personification. This focuses on a well-known individual as embodying and symboliz-
ing a particular ideology. It can be regarded as a shortcut that journalists use to simplify 
the issue, making it easier to insert discussion into the limited space of a news story.
Popular reaction. This shows the public’s reaction (e.g. surprise, outrage or support) 
regarding a corruption case and its actors. Public opinion survey results testing public 
reaction to the crisis may form part of such news.
Conquered booty. This frame focuses on the assets illegally acquired by the individu-
als involved, generally providing statistics to present the issue more dramatically.
Comparisons. This compares the current corruption case with others involving differ-
ent parties, politicians or governments.
Purification of responsibilities. This focuses on the reactions or punishment of indi-
viduals within political organizations as a political corruption crisis develops.
According to Thompson (2013: 166), issues and the ways they unfold are shaped by 
the particular set of conventions and expectations specific to the cultural form that is 
triggered. Since issues are shaped within the cultural context in which they occur, exist-
ing frames employed by earlier studies are insufficient for our particular case. As dis-
cussed in the next section, the 17 December corruption probe provides a useful case for 
studying the dynamics that exist between media outlets and political actors. By adopting 
an inductive approach while drawing on the existing literature’s methodologies, we pro-
pose the following specific frames relevant to the current context:
Corruption frame. This focuses on government members’ attempts to directly or indi-
rectly abuse their power for their own material benefit. Coverage of such events either 
explicitly mentions or implies that legal norms and/or ethical principles are violated.
Smear campaign frame. This is the anti-thesis of the corruption frame. Its defensive 
intention leads related news articles to discredit the corruption scandal as an attempt 
to damage the reputation of the government, or even to be a coup attempt.
Tampering. This frame emphasizes government malpractice regarding the proper 
functioning of the political system. It implies that the government interferes with 
officers (e.g. police or district attorneys) and tampers with evidence.
Sinister powers. This frame focuses on the presence of secretly operating national or 
international powers that seek to bring the country into turmoil. It is offensive in 
intent and content. News reports adopting this frame may target specific individuals 
or groups by accusing them of preventing the country’s development.
Fractures within sociopolitical camps. This frame focuses on group members’ 
speeches that are inconsistent with their group’s official discourses or their leaving the 
group as an indicator of weakening. It also implies that the sociopolitical camp is 
somehow disunited.
Fabricated news. This frame focuses on other media outlets’ news to discredit them 
as offering baseless claims or fabricated interviews. News reports employing this 
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frame accuse the given media outlet of manipulation or provocation through the dis-
tribution of fabricated messages (Table 1).
Turkey’s polarized media system
Since the first generation of journalists in Turkey, media and politics have had a fluctu-
ating relationship. Media’s struggle to shape public opinion and the politicians’ treat-
ment of media as a mere tool to disseminate propaganda have created tension between 
these two estates (Akser and Baybars-Hawks, 2012; Heper and Demirel, 1996). The 
roots of press repression and state censorship that is the distinctive difference between 
the Turkish and Western (especially Northern European and North Atlantic) media land-
scapes can be found in this ongoing tension. As outlined above, Turkey’s media system 
matches the polarized pluralist model. Çarkoğlu and Yavuz (2010) describe the intricate 
nature of government and media relations in Turkey with an emphasis on press–party 
parallelism:
Before the commercialization of the media, the Turkish state enjoyed substantial power over 
the media. However, after the deregulation of media markets, newspaper owners started to 
utilize the material benefits of a patrimonial/clientelistic relationship between the media [e.g. 
Table 1. Proposed issue-specific frames for a political corruption scandal in Turkey.
Frame Explanation Example
Corruption Violation of legal norms and/
or ethical principles for their 
benefits
Public officials’ misuse of 
public power
‘Tayyip, clean this (corruption) mess or 
resign and leave’ (Sözcü, 18 December 
2015)
‘The bribery and corruption operation 
that shakes Turkey’ (Zaman, 18 
December 2015)
Smear campaign Discrediting the 
developments as an attempt 
to damage the reputation/
image of the government
‘The objective of the operation: 
Discrediting politics’ (Sabah, 18 
December 2015)
Tampering Malpractices against proper 
functioning of the system
‘Deputy prosecuting attorney: Two 
of the prime minister’s men have 
threatened me’ (Zaman, 9 January 2014)
Sinister powers Powers that operate secretly 
and seek to weaken the 
government and lead the 
country into turmoil.
‘Principal pro-coup mindset: Fethullah 
Gülen’ (Sabah 17 January 2014)
Fractures within 
sociopolitical 
camps
Contradictory speeches in a 
given camp
‘Another resignation from AKP: That 
much insult is inacceptable’ (Zaman, 24 
February 2014)
Fabricated news Baseless claims by other 
outlets
‘6 lies in a single news report’ (Zaman, 
11 February 2014)
‘Response to Zaman: 6 truths’ (Sabah, 
12 February 2014)
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Sabah daily] and the state [e.g. the AKP government]. The result of this relationship is the 
instrumentalization of the media [examples added]. (p. 618)
Christensen (2010) also draws attention to media ownership and related constraints on 
freedom of expression in Turkey due to the concentration and conglomeration of Turkish 
media. In a more recent study on the 2011 Turkish elections, Çarkoğlu et al. (2014) con-
firmed earlier findings of high press–party parallelism in terms of major Turkish news-
papers’ political favouring of either AKP or Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican 
People’s party (CHP)). Toker (2015) had similar findings from comparing media cover-
age of the 2007 and the 2011 elections. Against this backdrop of increased press–party 
parallelism, this study explores the differential coverage of the political crisis due to the 
corruption probe in terms of the different frames that three competing media outlets pre-
ferred to adopt.
The 17 December 2013 political corruption scandal
Corruption allegations made on 17 December 2013 against several AKP government 
ministers and their sons turned the local elections on 30 March 2014 to one of the tensest 
in Turkey’s political history. Turkey subsequently witnessed an election in which allega-
tions of corruption and counter allegations of a coup attempt set the agenda much more 
than issues of local governance or the candidates’ visions.
Differentiation in the Turkish media over the scandal mainly stemmed from news 
outlets’ particular affiliations with conflicting groups (e.g. the pro-AKP Sabah versus the 
pro-Gülen movement Zaman) in their ontological struggle concerning the corruption 
probe. As former allies,4 the AKP5 and the Gülen/Hizmet movement (Fethullahçı)6 had 
‘domesticated’ the Kemalist7 military establishment through the institutionalization of 
the economy and the military’s marginalization. However, they then began to perceive 
each other as threats to the constitutional order.
Expectations and hypotheses
The crises leading up to the 2014 local elections provided a fertile ground for exploring 
differential use of media frames by three newspapers that have been reliably demon-
strated to favour specific political camps, either through organic ties or past coverage. 
However, this study does not aim just to describe the issue frames employed by the 
newspapers. Rather, we wish to show that, given the political alliances, frame differen-
tiation demonstrates a dynamic that can be inferred from the nature of the crises and the 
political alliances (implicit or explicit) between media groups and political movements 
or parties. We therefore propose the following interconnected hypotheses based on previ-
ous framing literature and the dynamics of party–press parallelism in Turkey:
H1. Outlets will adopt framing practices that make it easier to defend their political 
allegiances to help maintain the ontological security of their political camp.
This main hypothesis can be broken down into three specific sub-hypotheses:
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H1A. Pro-government Sabah will focus on helping to defend AKP but, given the com-
pelling nature of the evidence, will refuse to adopt the corruption frame.
That is, we expect Sabah to choose frames that deflect attention from the evidence 
presented by other news outlets:
H1B. Kemalist Sözcü will frame the issue in order to more easily attack and assign blame 
to AKP and its leaders, that is, through the corruption and personification frames.
H1C. Anti-AKP government, pro-Gülen Zaman will similarly focus on using the cor-
ruption probe to undermine the government’s authority. However, having until 
recently been allied to AKP, they will refrain from frames that can reflect negatively 
on the Gülen movement itself.
That is, we expect Zaman to adopt the corruption frame but not the personification 
frame, keeping its discussion at an institutional level lest it draws pro-Gülen politicians 
and bureaucrats into the corruption debate.
In addition to these three closely related hypotheses, we also hypothesize that, facing 
an abrupt, probably unexpected political assault, Sabah will initially adopt a defensive 
posture to deflect the assaults before later going on the offensive by attacking its political 
adversaries in AKP.
Methodology
This study analyses the frames used in three Turkish national newspapers from 18 
December 2013, when the investigations began, to 30 March 2014, when the local elec-
tions took place.
Data collection
Three daily newspapers were selected for the analysis: Sabah, Sözcü and Zaman. They 
were chosen because they have high circulation rates8 and their editorial policies closely 
follow the conflicting sides’ ideologies. Because readers may not be familiar with these 
media outlets, we briefly describe their styles of reporting.9
Sabah. Sabah is a pro-AKP national newspaper. After its acquisition by the pro-govern-
ment Calik Group, the paper became critical of CHP and a staunch defender of AKP. 
During the corruption probe, Sabah depicted the government ministers and their family 
members who were under investigation as victims of the actions of a parallel state 
(paralel devlet), which it claimed was carrying out a vicious campaign to smear the gov-
ernment. Sabah depicted this as an attack on the state itself.
Sözcü. This is a Kemalist nationalist paper with strong adherence to Republican ideals, 
particularly secularism, which makes it distinctly anti-AKP. During the corruption probe, 
Sözcü harshly criticized members of the government, particularly Erdoğan, who was 
prime minister at the time, by presenting them as being guilty of corruption.
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Zaman. Since its inception, Zaman was an advocate of moderate Islam, as taught by 
Fethullah Gülen.10 Allegedly financed by Gülen, Zaman supported the AKP government 
between 2002 and 2009 and was critical of the MHP and CHP. However, as tensions rose 
between Erdoğan and Gülen, Zaman began to oppose the AKP and criticized the govern-
ment during the probe.
Front page articles, as providing the most prominent coverage of the issue, were man-
ually selected for the content analysis. All selected articles dealt with the corruption 
probe in terms of the investigation itself, detentions, recordings of phone conversations 
between government officials and the speeches of people involved with the parties. In 
total, 708 newspaper articles were coded.
Coding procedure
For operationalization of the news frames, we drew heavily on measures developed by 
Semetko and Valkenburg (2000). Question items were developed and applied to all 
stories and had to be answered by coders with yes or no. Coding was carried out by two 
native speakers of Turkish. Both coders read and coded the articles independently. 
However, time and resource constraints prevented us from employing both coders for 
the entire article pool. Instead, the article pool was divided into three groups. Each 
coder was assigned to one of two groups, while the third group was coded by both for 
reliability checks. The commonly coded articles were analysed for intercoder reliability, 
yielding a Krippendorff’s (2004) alpha coefficient of .82. Considering the sheer number 
of discrete categories to be coded (i.e. the total number of different frames), the reliabil-
ity indicates that intercoder reliability was at more than acceptable levels.
Results and discussion
Table 2 summarizes the frame usage of the three newspapers for the entire period under 
study (18 December 2013 to 30 March 2014). The first pattern to be observed is the 
concentration in frame employment. For Sabah, the most frequently used three frames 
(sinister powers 65.56%, smear campaign 17.43% and personification 8.30%) account 
for 91.30% of all frames used. For Sözcü, the same figure (personification 15.98%, cor-
ruption 36.89% and tampering 30.33%) account for 83.20%. For Zaman, corruption 
25.70, tampering 56.33% and fracture within sociopolitical camp 6.53% account for 
88.57 %. For each newspaper, the next most frequently used frame is employed less 
than 5%of the time. This demonstrates that all three newspapers were indeed focussed 
on relatively few framing tactics. While we identified and coded 11 separate frames, our 
focus is on frames that are directly related to the political crisis of our study period.
Figures 1 to 3 show the evolution of the most frequently used frames for the newspapers. 
In these figures, frame usage is presented as a percentage of total frames, which allows us to 
control for the newspapers’ stylistic choices, such as page size and number of stories run on 
the first page. In order to control for daily spikes in content (e.g. a day with no frames must 
be coded as 0%, creating a sharp spike in the graph), we used 5-day rolling averages. 
Considering the three figures together provides a temporal map of the period in terms of 
most frequently used frames.
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Testing the hypotheses
H1A. Pro-government Sabah will focus on helping to defend AKP, but given the 
forceful and graphic nature of alleged evidence will refuse to adopt or function within 
the corruption frame. Sabah is expected to choose frames that deflect attention from 
the evidence presented.
Table 2. Total number of frames adopted by news outlets.
Sabah  
(pro-AKP)
Sözcü  
(pro-Kemalist)
Zaman  
(pro-Gülen)
 N % N % N %
Personification 20 8.30 39 15.98 5 2.04
Popular reaction 9 3.73 12 4.92 4 1.63
Conquered booty 0 0.00 5 2.05 2 0.82
Comparisons 2 0.83 1 0.41 1 0.41
Corruption 0 0.00 90 36.89 63 25.71
Smear campaign 42 17.43 1 0.41 2 0.82
Tampering 2 0.83 74 30.33 138 56.33
Sinister powers 158 65.56 6 2.46 0 0.00
Fracture within 
sociopolitical camp
0 0.00 4 1.64 16 6.53
Fabricated news 5 2.07 6 2.46 12 4.90
Economic 
consequences
3 1.24 6 2.46 2 0.82
y = -0.0019x + 78.928
R² = 0.2097
y = 0.0005x - 19.597
R² = 0.0056
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Sabah (% of all frames -5 day rolling averages)
Smear Campaign Sinister Powers
Linear Fit (Smear Campaign) Linear Fit (Sinister Powers)
Figure 1. Sabah’s use of smear campaign and sinister powers frames, 24 December–31March 
2014 (5-day rolling averages).
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y = -0.0002x + 7.5659
R² = 0.0017
y = 0.0007x - 27.707
R² = 0.013
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
Zaman (% of all frames -5 day rolling averages)
Corrupon Tampering Personificaon
Linear Fit (Corrupon) Linear Fit (Tampering)
Figure 3. Zaman’s use of corruption, tampering and personification frames, 24 December–
31March 2014 (5-day rolling averages).
y = 0.0052x - 214.27
R² = 0.4558
y = -0.0026x + 109.27
R² = 0.2125
y = -0.0024x + 99.177
R² = 0.3712
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
Sözcü (% of all frames -5 day rolling averages)
Corrupon Tampering
Personificaon Linear Fit (Corrupon)
Linear Fit (Tampering) Linear Fit (Personificaon)
Figure 2. Sözcü’s use of corruption, tampering and personification frames, 24 December to 31 
March 2014 (5-day rolling averages).
For Sabah, the sinister powers frame was the most significant, being adopted from the 
very first day of the corruption probe and utilized continuously until the end of our 
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research period. The smear campaign frame was the second most prevalent frame in 
Sabah.
When the investigation started, Sabah presented state officers and government offi-
cials and their families as victims of a smear campaign. However, in the first weeks of 
the investigation, the newspaper did not clearly identify the supposed powers behind this 
campaign. The term ‘parallel state’ started to emerge in mid-January. As Fethullah Gülen 
and the Hizmet movement began to be depicted as the once allied but now treacherous 
power that was supposedly behind all the attempts to undermine the government.
Our longitudinal analysis reveals that in December and in early January, Sabah mainly 
adopted the smear campaign frame. The defensive nature of the smear campaign frame 
helped Sabah gain time to articulate its own interpretation of the event. At the onset of 
the corruption crisis, Sabah arguably displays a reactionary and defensive strategy by 
adopting what we call the smear campaign frame as much as the sinister powers frame. 
As the initial shock of the corruption claims is overcome, the newspaper’s emphasis 
switches towards distributing blame, particularly by focusing on outside sources of influ-
ence. Thus, after mid-January, the newspaper began regularly using the sinister powers 
frame to ensure the group’s ontological security.
Personification was the third most commonly used frame in Sabah. Although this 
frame was employed by all the news outlets analysed in this paper, its content varied 
significantly. Sabah placed much emphasis on officials, such as district attorneys, who 
were investigating the probe,11 depicting them as abusing their authority. However, 
Fethullah Gülen himself was the focal point of Sabah’s personification frame. Sabah 
described Gülen and the Hizmet movement as a sinister power being used as a subcon-
tractor by larger international ‘evil powers’ that are ‘eager’ to prevent the rise of the 
‘New Turkey’.
Equally importantly though, Sabah never used a corruption frame, even in defence 
against an attack. While a hesitant stance, especially initially during the campaign, is 
to be expected, the total lack of the corruption frame suggests a very high degree of 
constraint and discipline within the media group. Our data do not allow us to offer a 
deeper understanding of this observation nor does it provide any evidence as to the 
motivation behind it, but we might offer an educated guess. The corruption probe and 
its coverage brought a frenzy almost unprecedented in Turkish politics. The evidence 
(voice recordings, photographs, etc.) was quite detailed and sometimes quite disturb-
ing, with some being very difficult to challenge. If the newspaper had been drawn into 
a discussion of specifics, it could have damaged the AKP. From an ontological security 
perspective, therefore, the newspaper would have both weakened the AKP’s position 
against its political adversaries and damaged its image in the eyes of its supporters if it 
had adopted the corruption frame. Accordingly, Sabah, reflecting the government’s 
strategy, first assumed a defensive posture that used the smear campaign frame as fre-
quently as the sinister powers frame before gradually adopting a more offensive (hence 
deflecting attention from the evidence) stance that emphasized sinister powers (both 
domestic and international).
H1B. Kemalist Sözcü will frame the issue that allows attacking AKP and assigning 
blame on AKP and its leaders easier, that is, corruption and personification frames.
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Lacking a clear connection to a political party, Sözcü seems to have felt relative free-
dom in attacking the AKP government and its leaders during the period under study. 
Initially, corruption and personification frames together accounted for almost 80% of the 
frame usage. Sözcü also started using the tampering frame early on. Unsurprisingly, it 
used the corruption frame most often, immediately accepting the allegations made dur-
ing the investigations and presenting them as completely true to argue that the suspects 
were guilty. For most of the period under study, the corruption frame saw steady usage. 
However, as the election approached, Sözcü refocussed almost entirely on the corruption 
frame, probably having decided that this would be most effective at swinging votes away 
from AKP.
Whereas Sabah increasingly utilized the sinister powers frame to explain AKP 
actions regarding the government officials involved in the investigation, Sözcü increas-
ingly adopted the tampering frame as the antithesis of the sinister powers frame. From 
Sözcü’s perspective, the AKP was trying to prevent the corruption investigation func-
tioning properly. Indeed, these same state officials (Tayyip Erdoğan and the govern-
ment ministers at the time), their families (including Bilal Erdoğan and the sons of 
other ministers) and business circles (Reza Zarrab, Süleyman Aslan, etc.) were fre-
quently presented via a frame of personification as the embodiment of corruption 
itself. Indeed, Sözcü utilized personification most often of the three newspapers. To 
some extent, Sözcü mentioned the same individuals as Sabah. However, while Sözcü 
used this frame in relation to a large pool of actors, the other outlets were much more 
selective. As described earlier, as regards Sabah and as will be described for Zaman, 
those outlets preferred to restrict their targets to those representing opposing ideolo-
gies. Like Sabah, the popular reaction frame was used by Sözcü, but in this case as a 
way to undermine the AKP’s legitimacy. Riots, demonstrations, protests and inter-
views with anti-AKP and Kemalist members of the public were Sözcü’s main sources 
of content as it adopted a popular reaction frame. In terms of the ways that outlets 
dramatized the events through narratives, Sözcü used the frame of conquered booty to 
make the case even more dramatic. The money counters, the money found in shoe-
boxes at the home of a bank manager close to AKP business circles and a watch worth 
US$300,000 that had been given to a former economy minister are prominent exam-
ples of the content of Sözcü’s conquered booty frame.
H1C. Pro-Gülen Zaman, also opposing AKP government, will similarly focus on 
using the corruption probe to undermine the government’s authority but having been 
allied to AKP until recently they will refrain from frames that can reflect negatively 
on the Gülen movement itself.
The pro-Gülen Zaman primarily used the frames of tampering and corruption, and, to 
a lesser extent, fractures within the sociopolitical camp. In December 2013, Zaman used 
corruption and tampering almost equally (23 and 27 times, respectively). In January 
2014, however, when the reappointment and detention of officials investigating the 
probe intensified and Fethullah Gülen and the Hizmet movements were presented as 
enemies of the state in Sabah, Zaman began to increase its usage of tampering. Arguably, 
this was the outcome of attempts to secure its ontology against Sabah’s use of the smear 
 at Istanbul Sehir Universitesi on November 29, 2016ejc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Panayırcı et al. 563
campaign frame against the Hizmet movement. Zaman also adopted this frame to present 
those affected by the government’s actions as victims. Although Zaman and Sözcü used 
the corruption frame fairly equally during first month of the probe, Zaman used it much 
less than Sözcü after mid-January.
In utilizing the fracture within the sociopolitical camp frame, Zaman tried to suggest 
that the AKP’s formal discourse is inherently flawed. This frame also served as an indi-
cator to claim that there are people even within the AKP’s ranks who sympathize with the 
Hizmet movement. As discussed above, Zaman and Sabah accused each other of unethi-
cal journalism. Zaman’s adoption of the fabricated news frame was used primarily to 
attack Sabah to claim that the outlet was manufacturing interviews and news to draw 
attention away from the inconsistency of its position.
Unlike Sözcü, however, Zaman was not free to develop its corruption probe coverage 
without restraint. Having been organically tied to the Gülen movement, which was itself 
a close ally of the AKP until recently, the newspaper had to approach the corruption 
scandal with more care and constraint than Sözcü (and other opposition outlets). 
Therefore, despite increasing personal attacks towards Fethullah Gülen himself, Zaman 
refrained from using the personification frame to the extent that it was never used after 
the first week of January 2014. On the other hand, relying too heavily on the corruption 
frame was not feasible either since the Gülen movement had members positioned in 
senior bureaucratic and political positions ever since AKP’s first election victory in 2002. 
Moving the debate onto personal or institutional grounds could therefore reflect nega-
tively on people associated with the Gülen movement who were also influential within 
AKP. Thus, this limited Zaman to frequent use of the only remaining frame suitable for 
attacking the AKP, namely tampering.
Conclusion
We selected the 17 December corruption probe in Turkey’s highly polarized media sys-
tem as our case on the basis that it was an event in which a variety of actors (the AKP, the 
Gülen movement and the Kemalists) would struggle to protect their ontological security 
via their affiliated media outlets. Indeed, our findings demonstrate that, due to overt 
partisanship within the Turkish mediascape at this critical conjuncture, there was signifi-
cant political parallelism in line with each news outlet’s affiliated political actors. 
Overall, our findings not only confirm earlier studies on press–party parallelism (Sabah-
AKP) but also reveal press–sociopolitical camp parallelism (Sözcü-Kemalists and 
Zaman-Gülenists) in Turkey’s polarized media system.
Although party–press parallelism is not a novel phenomenon in Turkish politics, the 
way it transcends party lines has not been studied extensively before. While others have 
shown parallels between newspapers and parties, our primary goal in this study was to 
show that party–press parallelism in Turkey extends further than newspapers demon-
strating a bias towards certain political parties. First, we have demonstrated that newspa-
pers adopt framing strategies commensurate with their political alliances. While this is 
not a novel finding, we also showed that, during a severe political crisis, the newspapers 
focussed on a narrow band of framing tactics designed to respond to the crisis in support 
and defence of a specific political group or party. In addition, and probably more 
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importantly, we have demonstrated how frame usage of newspapers that are considered 
to oppose the government varies.
This can be considered as proving our ontological security argument. In choosing 
frames, the main goal of an opposition newspaper is not only to oppose the government 
but also to do it in a way to maintain the ontological security of the political camp it 
belongs to. Thus, lacking organic ties to any political party, Sözcü chose more freely 
among the available frames while Zaman, having allied itself organically with the Gülen 
movement, had to refrain from using frames that could highlight the quite recent alliance 
between the AKP and the Gülen movement.
Further studies concerning issues of corruption could be used to test the explanatory 
power of the frames proposed in this study. They could also offer ways to compare and 
contrast the state institutional, political and social contexts in which news is produced. 
An intra-national comparative perspective could also be helpful in further testing the 
validity of our proposed frames in differing cultural settings (e.g. democracies and semi-
democracies) and applying qualitative methods, such as discourse analysis, could result 
in more insightful research outputs.
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Notes
 1. Reflecting the structural conditions in the media and the political system, the framework tends 
to neglect the role of agency and its subjective dimension. In parallel, criticism has emerged 
concerning the framework’s shortcomings and methodological problems in its application to 
cases outside the Western world. Indeed, these criticisms have prompted Hallin and Mancini 
(2012) to come up with an updated compiled book to discuss the political communication 
systems of countries in the non-Western world. In this study, prominent media researchers 
shared difficulties while applying the framework in non-Western contexts. For further stud-
ies on this framework and typology, see Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2006) and Goldman and 
Mutz (2011).
 2. Before investigating the role and impacts of the media on political corruption scandals, it is 
to first clarify the concept of corruption itself. Nye (1967) defines corruption as ‘behaviour 
which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, 
close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of 
certain types of private-regarding influence’ (p. 417). Although corruption also occurs in the 
private field of business, it is generally regarded as an act of state authority, as such individu-
als misuse the public power they are granted for private benefit (Allen and Savigny, 2012; 
Amundsen, 1999). Of course, this abuse may only become the focus of a scandal if it comes to 
light. Mediation therefore plays a vital role in the evolution of corruption into a scandal. Thus, 
the term ‘political corruption scandal’ defines a case in which corrupt behaviour is rendered 
visible to the public by media outlets, which drive the phenomenon to evoke social reactions.
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 3. Developed in the field of psychiatry, primarily by R. D. Laing (1990), as a means of under-
standing individuals’ struggles and hence their anxieties through a full sense of self, the con-
cept of ontological security as developed in the field of sociology by Antony Giddens aims 
to understand an individual’s behaviour and beliefs about his/her own security. According to 
Giddens (1991), ontological insecurity denotes an individual’s lack of a consistent feeling of 
‘biographical continuity’ and an obsessive preoccupation with apprehensions as regards pos-
sible risks to his/her existence. Given that our objective is to examine how collective identi-
ties disseminate narratives of self-identity and self/other distinctions through the media, this 
study will treat ontological security as an intersubjective concept that exists among differing 
collective identities.
 4. For a journalistic account of the evolving political–economic relations between the Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) and the Hizmet movement, see Ahmet Şık (2014) Paralel Yürüdük 
Biz Bu Yollarda (We Walked in Parallel through All Those Ways), İstanbul: Postacı.
 5. AKP emerged from the reformist wing of the rigid political Islamist ideological framework 
of the National Outlook (Milli Görüş) in response to the repressive nature of industrializa-
tion projects and the way Western modernity was imposed on Turkey in the 1970s. R. Tayyip 
Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç founded the AKP in 2001. See M. Hakan Yavuz 
(2006).
 6. The Turkish Sufi scholar Fethullah Gülen and his many followers are known as Fethullahçı. 
They are often unwilling to declare themselves openly so the distinction between members, 
followers, sympathizers and collaborators is unclear. Estimates of the membership vary 
between 200,000 and 4 million Turks. They are devout individuals who disseminate the val-
ues and ideas of Fethullah Gülen through the Islamic principle of hizmet (service) in a variety 
of ways, such as high schools, university preparatory schools, universities and the media (e.g. 
Zaman). See Bilici (2006), Bacik and Kurt (2011), Lorasdağı (2013) and Yavuz (2013).
 7. Current Turkish domestic political arrangements and tensions cannot be fully grasped with-
out acknowledging the role of the Ottoman experience in shaping the mindset of the repub-
lic’s founders, namely, Kemalism (Kemalizm), after its founder, Mustafa Kemal ‘Atatürk’. 
Kemalism has become a sort of political religion with its own dogmas, myths, ethnics and 
liturgy. In Turkish politics today, devotion to the ideological strictness of Kemalism has been 
embraced by large swathes of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) and Turkish civil society, 
as can be seen in Sözcü. See Hanioğlu (2013) and Mateescu (2006).
 8. Over the course of analysis, Zaman, Sözcü and Sabah are nationally ranked first, third and 
fifth, respectively, circulation wise. Circulation data are from www.medyatava.com
 9. For a detailed description and discussion of the political affiliations of Turkish newspapers, 
see http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/turkish-news.pdf
10. As of March, 2016 Zaman started running by appointed government trustees and adopted a 
pro-government editorial policy. For detailed information, see http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/mar/06/seized-turkish-opposition-newspaper-zaman-erdogan-government
11. Muammer Akkaş and Zekeriya Öz.
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